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Abstract
We introduce bisemivalues for bicooperative games and we also provide an
interesting characterization of this kind of values by means of weighting coef-
ficients in a similar way than given for semivalues in the context of cooperative
games. Moreover, the notion of induced bisemivalues on lower cardinalities
also makes sense and an adaptation of Dragan’s recurrence formula is obtained.
Besides its characterization, a computational procedure in terms of the multi-
linear extension of the game is given
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1 Introduction
The value theory started in 1953 with Shapley [28], who introduced the axiomatic
method in game theory to define a solution concept called now the Shapley value.
The axioms for this value are efficiency,1 the null player property, symmetry, and ad-
ditivity. In 1954, Shapley and Shubik [29] applied for the first time the Shapley value
as a power index (i.e., on simple games). In 1965, Banzhaf [2] defined a different
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1This property states that åi2N ji[v] = v(N) for all v 2 GN .
power index, also obtained in 1971 by Coleman [15] when focussing, rather, on “col-
lective power”. In 1975, Owen [25] extended the nonnormalized Banzhaf–Coleman
power index to all cooperative games, giving rise to the dummy–independent Banzhaf
value, which fails to be efficient.
In 1981, Dubey et al [17] set aside efficiency and proposed the family of semivalues,
each one of which is defined by weighting coefficients that apply to the marginal
contributions v(S [ fig)  v(S) and are common to all coalitions of a given size.
The Shapley value is the only efficient semivalue and the Banzhaf value is the only
semivalue with constant coefficients. In 2000, Puente [27] (see also Gime´nez [20]
or Amer and Gime´nez [1]) defined a special family, binomial semivalues: for each
one of them, the weighting coefficients depend on a unique parameter p 2 [0;1]–the
Banzhaf value corresponds to p = 1=2. A full analysis of these values appears in
Carreras and Puente [14]. In 2003, Carreras, Freixas and Puente [13] established the
foundations of semivalues as power indices.
In 1988, Weber [30] went further, dropped anonymity, and defined the family of
probabilistic values, each one of which requires weighting coefficients piS for each
player i and each coalition SNnfig (of course, anonymity characterizes semivalues
within this new family). The payoff that a probabilistic value allocates to each player
is thus, again, a weighted sum of his marginal contributions in the game. We quote
from Weber [30].
Bicooperative games were introduced by Bilbao et al [3] as a generalization of clas-
sical cooperative games, where each player can participate positively to the game,
negatively, or do not participate. Then, in this kind of games consider pairs (S;T )
with S; T  N and S\T = /0. Thus, (S;T ) yields a partition of the set of players N in
three groups: (i) players in S are defenders of modifying the actual situation and they
want to accept a proposal; (ii) players in T do not agree with it and they will take
actions against any change; and (iii) the members of N n (S[T ) are not convinced of
the profits of the change, but they do not stop the actions managed by players in S,
that is, they do not have intention of objecting to it. One may think that bicooperative
games can be seen as a particular case of games with n players and r alternatives (for
r = 3), introduced by Bolger in [9] and [10].
A central question in game theory is to define a solution concept for a game, that is, a
function which assigns to every game a set of real–valued vectors, each one of them
represents a payoff distribution among the players. In the context of bicooperative
games this concept has also been studied and different solution concepts have been
introduced. In 2000, Bilbao et al [4] introduced the Shapley value for bicooperative
games. In [5] and [8] Bilbao et al introduced the core, the Weber set and the selec-
tope for bicooperative games. In [6] Bilbao et al defined and characterized biprob-
abilistic values for bicooperative games following Weber’s characterization [30] of
2
probabilistic values on cooperative games. In 2010 Bilbao et al [7] analized ternary
bicooperative games, which are a refinement of the ternary voting games introduced
in [18], and defined and axiomatized the Banzhaf power index for these games. Other
different definitions of values for bicooperative games can be found in Grabisch and
Labreuche [22] and [23]. Borkotokey et al [12] prove the existence of a unique po-
tential for bicooperative games and the marginal contribution vector of this potential
function coincides with the Shapley value introduced by Bilbao et al [4]. In 2012,
Borkotokey and Sarmah [11] introduce the notion of a bicooperative game with fuzzy
bicoalitions and an explicit form of the Shapley value as a possible solution concept
to a particular class of such games is also obtained.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and to characterize bisemivalues for bicooper-
ative games– as a particular family of biprobabilistic values– that parallels the ex-
isting statements for semivalues on cooperative games given by Dubey et al in [17].
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we include a minimum
of preliminaries that refers to semivalues for cooperative games and biprobabilistics
values for bicooperative games. Section 3 is devoted to define bisemivalues for bi-
cooperative games and to give the main theorem of the paper, that clearly reminds
the characterization obtained by Dubey, Neyman and Weber [17] for semivalues on
cooperative games. Moreover we deals with induced bisemivalues on lower cardinal-
ities and an adaptation of Dragan’s recurrence formula [16] is obtained. In Section 4
we introduce the binomial bisemivalues and prove that they are characterized by the
(simplest form of) monotonicity of the weighting coefficients, which lie therefore in
geometric progression. We also give a computational procedure in terms of the MLE
of the game to calculate them. Finally, Section 6 contains two applications of the
bisemivalues to the analysis of two examples.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative games and semivalues
Let N be a finite set of players and 2N be the set of its coalitions (subsets of N). A
cooperative game on N is a function v : 2N ! R, that assigns a real number v(S) to
each coalition S N, with v( /0) = 0. A game v is monotonic if v(S) v(T ) whenever
S T  N and simple if, moreover, v(S) = 0 or 1 for every S N.
By a value on GN we will mean a map f : GN ! RN , that assigns to every game v a
vector f [v] with components fi[v] for all i 2 N.
According Weber’s [30] axiomatic description, Y : GN ! RN is a semivalue iff it
satisfies the following properties:
(i) linearity: Y[v+v0] =Y[v]+Y[v0] (additivity) andY[lv] = lY[v] for all v;v0 2GN
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and l 2 R;
(ii) anonymity: Yqi[qv] =Yi[v] for all permutation q on N, i 2 N, and v 2 GN ;
(iii) positivity: if v is monotonic, then Y[v] 0;
(iv) dummy player property: if i 2 N is a dummy in game v, then Yi[v] = v(fig).
There is an interesting characterization of semivalues, by means of weighting coef-
ficients, due to Dubey, Neyman and Weber [17]. Set n = jNj. Then: (a) for every
weighting vector fpkgn 1k=0 such that
n 1
å
k=0
pk
 n 1
k

= 1 and pk  0 for all k, the expres-
sion
Yi[v] = å
SNnfig
ps[v(S[fig)  v(S)] for all i 2 N and all v 2 GN ;
where s= jSj, defines a semivalueY; (b) conversely, every semivalue can be obtained
in this way; (c) the correspondence given by fpkgn 1k=0 7! y is bijective.
Thus, the payoff that a semivalue allocates to every player in any game is a weighted
sum of his marginal contributions in the game. If pk is interpreted as the probability
that a given player i joins a coalition of size k, provided that all the coalitions of a
common size have the same probability of being joined, then Yi[v] is the expected
marginal contribution of that player to a random coalition he joins.
Well known examples of semivalues are the Shapley value j (Shapley [28]), for which
pk = 1=n
 n 1
k

, and the Banzhaf value b (Owen [25]), for which pk = 21 n. The
Shapley value j is the only efficient semivalue, in the sense that å
i2N
ji[v] = v(N) for
every v 2 GN .
Notice that these values are defined for each N. The same happens with the binomial
semivalues, introduced by Puente [27] (see also Gime´nez [20] or Amer and Gime´nez
[1]) as follows. Let p 2 [0;1] and pk = pk(1  p)n k 1 for k = 0;1; : : : ;n  1. Then
fpkgn 1k=0 is a weighting vector and defines a semivalue that will be denoted asYp and
called the p–binomial semivalue. Using the convention that 00 = 1, the definition
makes sense also for p= 0 and p= 1, where we respectively get the dictatorial index
Y0 and themarginal indexY1, introduced by Owen [26] and such thatY0i [v] = v(fig)
and Y1i [v] = v(N)  v(Nnfig) for all i 2 N and all v 2 GN . Of course, p= 1=2 gives
Y1=2 = b—the Banzhaf value.
Finally, the multilinear extension 2 of a game v 2 GN , introduced by Owen [24], is
the real–valued function defined in Rn by
f (x1;x2; : : : ;xn) = å
SN
Õ
i2S
xi Õ
j2NnS
(1  x j)v(S):
2The term “multilinear” means that, for each i 2 N, the function is linear in xi, that is, of the form
fv(x1;x2; : : : ;xn) = gi(x1;x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ;xn)xi+hi(x1;x2; : : : ; x^i; : : : ;xn).
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As is well known, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values of any cooperative game v
can be obtained from its multilinear extension. Indeed, j[v] can be calculated by
integrating the partial derivatives of the multilinear extension of the game along the
main diagonal x1 = x2 =   = xn of the cube [0;1]n [24], while the partial derivatives
of that multilinear extension, evaluated at point (1=2;1=2; : : : ;1=2), give b[v] [25].
This latter procedure extends well to any p–binomial semivalue (see Puente [27],
Freixas and Puente [19] or Amer and Gime´nez [1]) by evaluating the derivatives at
point (p; p; : : : ; p).
2.2 Bicooperative games and biprobabilistic values
Let N be a finite set of players and 3N = f(S;T ) : S;T  N; S\T = /0g be the set
of all ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions. Grabisch and Labreuche [21] proposed a
relation in 3N given by
(A;B)v (C;D), AC; B D:
Following [3], a bicooperative game on N is a function b : 3N ! R, that assigns a
real number b(S;T ) to each pair of coalitions (S; T ) 2 3N , with b( /0; /0) = 0. For
each (S;T ) 2 3N , the worth b(S;T ) represents the maximal gain (if b(S;T ) > 0) or
the minimal loss (if b(S;T ) < 0) that is obtained when players in S are in favor of a
change in the situation, players in T are against the change and players in N n (S[T )
are indifferent. Then b( /0;N) is the cost obtained when all players are against the
change and b(N; /0) is the maximal gain obtained when all players want to change the
initial situation. We will denote by BGN the set of all bicooperative games on N.
A bicooperative game is monotonic if b(S;T )  b(S0;T 0) whenever (S;T ) v (S0;T 0)
and ternary if, moreover b(S;T ) 2 f 1;0;1g for all (S;T ) 2 3N . A biweighted
ternary bicooperative game, represented by the scheme b [[k1;w1; :::;wn]; [k2;m1; :::mn]],
is the ternary bicooperative game defined by
b(S;T ) =
8><>:
1 if w(S) k1 and m(T )< k2
 1 if w(S)< k1 and m(T ) k2
0 otherwise,
where wi > 0 is the number of votes of player i to approve a decision and mi > 0 is
the number of votes of player i to block it and 0< k1  w(N);0< k2  m(N),
A player i 2 N is a dummy in b if b(S[fig;T ) = b(S;T )+ b(fig; /0) and b(S;T [
fig= b(S;T )+b( /0;fig) for all (S;T )2 3Nnfig, and null in b if, moreover, b(fig; /0) =
b( /0;fig) = 0. Two players i; j 2 N are symmetric in b if b(S[fig;T ) = b(S[f jg;T )
for all S Nnfi; jg and b(S;T [fig) = b(S;T [f jg) for all T  Nnfi; jg.
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Given a nonempty coalition R N, the restriction to R of a given game b on N is the
game bjR on R that we will call a subgame of b and is defined by bjR(S;T ) = b(S;T )
for all S;T  R.
Endowed with the natural operations for real–valued functions, the set of all bico-
operative games on N is a vector space BGN . For every (S;T ) 2 3N such that
(S;T ) 6= ( /0; /0), the identity game d(S;T ) is defined by d(S;T )(A;B)= 1 if (A;B)= (S;T )
and d(S;T )(A;B)= 0 otherwise and it is easily checked that the set of all identity games
is a basis for BGN , so that dim(BGN) = 3n 1 if n= jNj.
By a value on BGN we will mean a map g : BGN ! RN , that assigns to every game
b a vector g[b] with components gi[b] for all i 2 N.
In [6] Bilbao et al defined and characterized biprobabilistic values for bicooperative
games as follows.
Definition 2.1 A value f for player i on BGN is a biprobabilistic value if there exist
two collections of real numbers fpi(S;T ) : (S;T )2 3Nnfigg and fqi(S;T ) : (S;T )2 3Nnfigg
satisfying pi(S;T )  0, qi(S;T )  0, å
(S;T )23Nnfig
pi(S;T ) = 1 and å
(S;T )23Nnfig
qi(S;T ) = 1 such
that,
fi[b] = å
(S;T )23Nnfig
h
pi(S;T )(b(S[fig;T ) b(S;T ))+qi(S;T )(b(S;T ) b(S;T [fig))
i
for every game b 2 BGN .
Notice that fi[b] is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions b(S [ fig;T ) 
b(S;T ), whenever i joins coalition SNnfig and his marginal contributions b(S;T ) 
b(S;T [fig) whenever i leaves coalition T [fig, where pi(S;T ) is the probability that
player i joins S and qi(S;T ) is the probability that player i leaves T [ i.
Following Bilbao’s axiomatic description [6], a value f on BGN is a probabilistic
value if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
(i) linearity: f[b+b0] = f[b]+f[b0] (additivity) and f[lb] = lf[b] for all b;b0 2GBN
and l 2 R;
(ii) positivity: if b is monotonic, then f[b] 0;
(iii) dummy player property: if i 2 N is a dummy in game b, then fi[b] = b(fig; /0) 
b( /0;fig).
3 Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
In this section we introduce and study bisemivalues for bicooperative games. This
includes, besides the axiomatic description, a characterization of them by means of
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weighting coefficients that parallels the existent characterization of semivalues given
by Dubey, Neyman and Weber [17] in the context of cooperative games.
In a similar way to the cooperative case, for the comparison of roles in a game to be
meaningful, the evaluation of a particular position should depend on the structure of
the game but not on the labels of the players.
From now on we will denote S[fig and Snfig by S[ i and Sn i respectively.
In order to define this family we need to introduce a new axiom.
Definition 3.1 Anonymity axiom. fpi[pb] = fi[b] for all permutation p over N, i 2 N,
and b 2 BGN , where pb(pS;pT ) = b(S;T ) and pS= fpi : i 2 Sg.
Now we are ready to introduce bisemivalues on bicooperative games following We-
ber’s axiomatic description of semivalues on cooperative games.
Definition 3.2 A bisemivalue on BGN is a map y : BGN ! RN that satisfies linear-
ity, anonymity, positivity and dummy player property.
As we will see, anonymity characterizes bisemivalues within the family of biproba-
bilistic values.
Theorem 3.3 A value y on BGN is a bisemivalue if and only if there exist two col-
lections of real numbers ps;t and qs;t satisfying:
ps;t  0;qs;t  0;
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

ps;t
#
= 1;
n 1
å
t=0

n 1
t
"n t 1
å
s=0

n  t 1
s

qs;t
#
= 1;
(1)
such that
yi[b] = å
(S;T )23Nni
[ps;t(b(S[ i;T ) b(S;T ))+qs;t(b(S;T ) b(S;T [ i))]
for all i 2 N and all b 2 BGN , where s= jSj and t = jT j.
Proof (() Taking into account that bisemivalues are a particular case of biproba-
bilistic values, linearity, dummy and positivity are proved in [6]. Anonimity follows
from the fact that the weighting coefficients only depend of the cardinality of S and
T
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()) Following [6], it suffices to prove that if a biprobabilistic value satisfies the
anonymity axiom then pi(S;T ) = ps;t and q
i
(S;T ) = qs;t for all (S;T ) 2 3Nni with s= jSj
and t = jT j, for all i 2 N.
Let f be a biprobabilistic value then
fi[b] = å
(S;T )23Nni
h
pi(S;T )(b(S[ i;T ) b(S;T ))+qi(S;T )(b(S;T ) b(S;T [ i))
i
for each i 2 N and for every game b 2 BGN .
For every (S;T ) 2 3N such that (S;T ) 6= ( /0; /0), the identity game d(S;T ) is defined by
d(S;T )(A;B) =
(
1 if (A;B) = (S;T )
0 otherwise
Notice that fi(d(S[i;T )) = pi(S;T ) and fi(d(S;T[i)) =  qi(S;T ) for all i 2 N and (S;T ) 2
3Nni
Let (S;T ) and (S0;T 0) be signed coalitions in 3Nni such that (S;T );(S0;T 0) 6= ( /0; /0)
satisfying that jSj = jS0j < n  1 and jT j = jT 0j < n  1. Consider a permutation p
over N that takes pS = S0 and pT = T 0 while living i fixed. Then pd(S;T ) = d(S0;T 0).
By the anonymity axiom we have
fi(d(S[i;T )) = fi(d(S0[i;T 0)) and fi(d(S;T[i)) = fi(d(S0;T 0[i))
Then pi(S;T ) = p
i
(S0;T 0) and q
i
(S;T ) = q
i
(S0;T 0).
Now, let i; j 2 N, i 6= j and let (S;T ) 2 3Nni; j. Let us consider the permutation p
over N that interchanges i and j while leaving the remaining players fixed. Since
pd(S;T ) = d(S;T ) we have
fi(d(S[i;T )) = f j(d(S[ j;T )) and fi(d(S;T[i)) = f j(d(S;T[ j))
Moreover,
fi(d(N; /0)) = f j(d(N; /0)) and fi(d( /0;N)) = f j(d( /0;N))
Hence, for every (S;T ) 2 3Nni; j there exists ps;t and qs;t such that pi(S;T ) = ps;t and
qi(S;T ) = qs;t for all i 2 N. 
Remark 3.4 (a) The payoff that a bisemivalue allocates to every player in any game
is a weighted sum of his marginal contributions b(S[ fig;T )  b(S;T ) whenever
i joins coalition S  N n fig and his marginal contributions b(S;T )  b(S;T [ fig)
whenever i leaves coalition T [fig, where pst is the probability that player i joins S
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and qst is the probability that player i leaves T [ i, provided that all the coalitions of a
common size have the same probability of being joined and lived. Notice that among
biprobabilistic values, bisemivalues are characterized by the fact that all coalitions of
a given size share common weights with regard to all players.
(b) Among bisemivalues, the Shapley value [4], denoted here by j, for which
ps;t =
(n+ s  t)!(n+ t  s 1)!
(2n)!
2n s t and qs;t =
(n+ t  s)!(n+ s  t 1)!
(2n)!
2n s t ;
was characterized by Bilbao et al [4] as the only efficient bisemivalue –in the sense
that its total power for every b 2 BGN is å
i2N
ji[b] = b(N; /0) b( /0;N)– satisfying the
structural axiom.
The Banzhaf value [7] denoted here by b, for which ps;t = qs;t =

1
3
n 1
is the only
bisemivalue with constant weighting coefficients, that is, weighting coefficients do
not depend on the size of the coalitions S and T .
(c) As it is well known, semivalues for cooperative games are defined on cardinalities
rather than on specific player sets: this means that a weighting vector fpkgn 1k=0 defines
a semivalue Y on all N such that n = jNj. When necessary, we shall write Y(n) for
a semivalue on cardinality n and pnk for its weighting coefficients. A semivalue Y
(n)
induces semivalues Y(t) for all cardinalities t < n, recurrently defined by the Pascal
triangle (inverse) formula given by Dragan [16]:
ptk = p
t+1
k + p
t+1
k+1 for 0 k < t; (2)
A series Y = fY(n)g¥n=1 of semivalues, one for each cardinality, satisfies Dragan’s
recurrence formula. and we will say that Y is a multisemivalue. Particularly, the
Shapley, the Banzhaf values and all binomial semivalues are multisemivalues.
As we will see, things are very similar to bisemivalues on bicooperative games.
Following Theorem 3.3, analogously to the cooperative case, bisemivalues are also
defined on cardinalities rather than on specific player set: that is, two weighting vec-
tors ps;t and qs;t define a bisemivalue y on all N such that n= jNj. When necessary,
we shall write y(n) for a bisemivalue on cardinality n, pns;t and qns;t for its weighting
coefficients.
Proposition 3.5 Given a bisemivalue y(n) on BGN with weighting coefficients pns;t
and qns;t , the recursively obtained numbers
pm 1s;t = p
m
s+1;t + p
m
s;t + p
m
s;t+1;
qm 1s;t = q
m
s+1;t +q
m
s;t +q
m
s;t+1
(3)
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for 0  s; t < m  n, define a induced bisemivalue y(m) on the space of bicooper-
ative games with m players.
Proof Let y(n) be a bisemivalue with weighting coefficients pns;t and qns;t .
It suffices to prove that if y(n) is a bisemivalue on BGN then the induced weighting
coefficients pn 1s;t and qn 1s;t obtained from (3) define a bisemivalue y(n 1) on bicoop-
erative games with n 1 players.
We have to check that the induced weighting coefficients satisfy (1). It is straight-
forward to verify pn 1s;t  0 and qn 1s;t  0. The remaining condition for the weighting
coefficients pn 1s;t follows from the fact that:
n 2
å
s=0

n 2
s
"n s 2
å
t=0

n  s 2
t

pn 1s;t
#
=
n 2
å
s=0

n 2
s
"n s 2
å
t=0

n  s 2
t

(pns+1;t + p
n
s;t + p
n
s;t+1)
#
=
n 2
å
s=0

n 2
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

pns;t +
n s 2
å
t=0

n  s 2
t

pns+1;t
#
=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

pns;t
#
= 1:
And analogously for the weighting coefficients qn 1s;t . 
Definition 3.6 A series y= fy(n)g¥n=1 of bisemivalues, one for each cardinality, is a
multibisemivalue if and only if it satisfies (3).
Proposition 3.7 The expression of the weighting coefficients of any induced bisemi-
value y(m) in terms of the coefficients of the original bisemivalue y(n), are
pms;t =
n m
å
i=0

n m
i
 n m i
å
j=0

n m  i
j

pns+i;t+ j;
qms;t =
n m
å
i=0

n m
i
 n m i
å
j=0

n m  i
j

pns+i;t+ j
(4)
for 0 s; t < m< n.
Proof It follows by applying (3) repeatedly. 
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4 Binomial bisemivalues
In 2000, Puente [27] (see also Gime´nez [20] or Amer and Gime´nez [1]) defined a
special family of semivalues on cooperative games, binomial semivalues: for each
one of them, the weighting coefficients depend on a unique parameter p 2 [0;1]—the
Banzhaf value corresponds to p = 1=2. These semivalues are especially suited for
the study of cooperative games where the players show some (common) tendency to
form coalitions. This tendency is defined by parameter p.
Which is the reason for letting p range from 0 to 1? Notice that a reasonable regularity
assumption on players’ behavior is that the probability to form coalitions follows
a monotonic (increasing or decreasing) behavior. Then, the only semivalues such
that pk+1 = lpk for all k are precisely the p–binomial semivalues, in which case
l= p=(1  p) for each p 2 [0;1].
Following this idea, we introduce in this section a subfamily of bisemivalues, called
binomial bisemivalues. As we will see, they ”extend” the concept of binomial semi-
values to bicooperative games. The fact that a parameter p 2 [0;1] defines this new
family of bisemivalues introduces new interesting features in the evaluation of bico-
operative games.
Proposition 4.1 Let p 2 [0;1], then the coefficients ps;t = p
s(1 p)n s 1
2n s 1 and qs;t =
pt(1 p)n t 1
2n t 1 where s = jSj and t = jT j defines a bisemivalue for the bicooperative
games.
Proof We have to prove that the weighting coefficients satisfy (1). It is straightfor-
ward to verify that ps;t  0 and qs;t  0. The remaining condition for the weighting
coefficients ps;t follows from the fact that:
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

ps;t
#
=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

ps(1  p)n s 1
2n s 1
#
=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1
2n s 1
"
n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t
#
=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s

ps(1  p)n s 1= 1
The case of qs;t follows similarly. 
Definition 4.2 (i) The dictatorial index D for player i 2 N is given by
Di[b] =
1
2n 1 å
(S;T )23Nni
[(b(i;T ) b( /0;T ))+(b(S; /0) b(S; i))] ; for all b 2 BGN :
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(ii) The marginal indexM for player i 2 N is given by
Mi[b] = å
(S;T )23Nni
[(b(N;T ) b(N n i;T ))+(b(S;N n i) b(S;N))] ; for all b 2 BGN :
Definition 4.3 Let p 2 [0;1]. The p–binomial bisemivalue yp on BGN is defined by
the coefficients ps;t =
ps(1 p)n s 1
2n s 1 and qs;t =
pt(1 p)n t 1
2n t 1 where s = jSj and t = jT j.
In case of p = 0 and p = 1 using the convention 00 = 1, we respectively obtain the
dictatorial index D= y0 and the marginal indexM = y1.
In next proposition we characterize the binomial bisemivalues as the only bisemival-
ues whose weighting coefficients are in geometric progression, that is, technically
they are characterized by the (simplest form of) monotonicity of the weighting coef-
ficients.
Proposition 4.4 Let p 2 (0;1). A bisemivalue y on BGN is a p-binomial bisemi-
value if and only if its weighting coefficients are in geometric progression.
Proof ()) Let yp be a p-binomial bisemivalue, following Definition 4.3, we obtain
ps+1;t
ps;t
=
qs;t+1
qs;t
=
2p
1  p :
(() Conversely, if ps+1;t = kps;t for 0 s< n and k> 0, we can write ps;t = ksp0;t =
ksp0;0 so that the second condition in (1) allows us to determine the parametric
expression for the weighting coefficients:
1=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s
"n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t

ps;t
#
=
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s

ksp0;0
"
n s 1
å
t=0

n  s 1
t
#
= p0;0
n 1
å
s=0

n 1
s

ks2n s 1 = p0;0(2+ k)n 1:
and hence, p0;0 = 1=(2+ k)n 1 = (1  p)n 1=2n 1. From the recursive formula
ps;t = ksp0;t = ksp0;0 we obtain the remaining weighting coefficients until pn 1;0 =
kn 1=(2+ k)n 1 = pn 1.
So, p= k=(2+ k). The case of qs;t follows similarly. 
Remark 4.5 The only p–binomial bisemivalues satisfying ps;t = qs;t , that is, which
weights in a same way the marginal contributions of players in favor or against the
change are for p = 0;1=3;1, corresponding to the dictatorial index, the Banzhaf
bisemivalue and the marginal index respectively.
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4.1 Computational procedure
The MLE technique has been a useful tool for the calculus of values on cooperative
games: it applies to e.g. the Shapley value (Owen [25]), the Banzhaf value (Owen
[27]) and all binomial semivalues (Puente [32]). In this section first we introduce the
multilinear extension of a bicooperative game that parallels the existing multilinear
extension of a cooperative game given by Owen in [24] and then, we provide a method
to compute binomial bisemivalues by means of the multilinear extension of the game.
We identify each (S;T )2 3N by vectors (X ;Y;Z) ofR3n such that X =(x1; : : : ;xn); Y =
(y1; : : : ;yn); Z = (z1; : : : ;zn) and
xi =
(
1 if i 2 S
0 otherwise
; yi =
(
1 if i 2 T
0 otherwise
and zi =
(
1 if i 2 N n (S[T )
0 otherwise.
For instead, if N = f1;2;3g the coalitions (f1;3g;f2g) and (f1;2g; /0) are identi-
fied by (X ;Y;Z) = (1;0;1;0;1;0;0;0;0) and (X ;Y;Z) = (1;1;0;0;0;0;0;0;1) respec-
tively.
A bicooperative game b is a real-valued function defined on the corners of [0;1]3n.
We shall extend this function throughout [0;1]3n in a manner that is linear in which
variable. This is the multilinear extension of b.
Definition 4.6 The multilinear extension of a game b2BGN is the real-valued func-
tion defined on R3n by
f (X ;Y;Z) = å
(S;T )23N
"
Õ
i2S
xiÕ
j2T
y j Õ
k2Nn(S[T )
zk
#
b(S;T ): (5)
where X = (x1; : : : ;xn); Y = (y1; : : : ;yn); Z = (z1; : : : ;zn) 2 [0;1]n.
It is easy to prove that f coincides with b where b is defined.
Proposition 4.7 If yp is a p–binomial bisemivalue and f is the multilinear extension
of a game b 2 BGN then
ypi [b] =

¶ f
¶xi
  ¶ f
¶zi

P;
1 P
2
;
1 P
2

+

¶ f
¶zi
  ¶ f
¶yi
1 P
2
;P;
1 P
2

for all i 2 N, where P= (p; n^: : :; p) and 1 P
2
= (1 p2 ;
n
^: : :; 1 p2 ).
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Proof From Definition 4.6 the partial derivatives of f with respect to xi, yi, zi are:
¶ f
¶xi
(X ;Y;Z) = å
(S;T )23Nni
"
Õ
j2S
x jÕ
k2T
yk Õ
l2Nn(S[T[i)
zl
#
b(S[ i;T );
¶ f
¶yi
(X ;Y;Z) = å
(S;T )23Nni
"
Õ
j2S
x jÕ
k2T
yk Õ
l2Nn(S[T[i)
zl
#
b(S;T [ i);
¶ f
¶zi
(X ;Y;Z) = å
(S;T )23Nni
"
Õ
j2S
x jÕ
k2T
yk Õ
l2Nn(S[T[i)
zl
#
b(S;T );
then
¶ f
¶xi
(X ;Y;Z)  ¶ f
¶zi
(X ;Y;Z)= å
(S;T )23Nni
"
Õ
j2S
x jÕ
k2T
yk Õ
l2Nn(S[T[i)
zl
#
[b(S[i;T ) b(S;T )]
(6)
¶ f
¶zi
(X ;Y;Z)  ¶ f
¶yi
(X ;Y;Z)= å
(S;T )23Nni
"
Õ
j2S
x jÕ
k2T
yk Õ
l2Nn(S[T[i)
zl
#
[b(S;T ) b(S;T [i)]
(7)
Finally, valuating (6) at point (P; 1 P2 ;
1 P
2 ) and (7) at point (
1 P
2 ;P;
1 P
2 ) and adding
these two results, we obtain the p–binomial bisemivalue
ypi [b] = å
(S;T )23Nni

ps(1  p)n s 1
2n s 1
(b(S[ i;T ) b(S;T ))+ p
t(1  p)n t 1
2n t 1
(b(S;T ) b(S;T [ i))

:
Corollary 4.8 If p= 1=3, that is y1=3 = b the Banzhaf value, and f is the multilinear
extension of a game b 2 BGN then
bi[b] =

¶ f
¶xi
  ¶ f
¶yi
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3

:
5 Examples
In this section we present two examples of bicooperative games. The allocations
obtained by the players in both cases will be analyzed by using p–binomial bisemi-
values and we will compute them by using the MLE technique given in Proposition
4.7.
Example 5.1 (Biweighted ternary bicooperative game) The board of directors of a
professional sports club is formed by 11 members. Only the shareholders with a
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minimum number of shares are represented and the seats are allocated according to
the number of shares. At this time there are represented three groups of shareholders:
the first with six votes, the second with 4 votes and the third with one vote. At least
seven votes are required to approve a proposal and a minimum of 5 votes to block it.
This voting system can be modeled by the biweighted ternary bicooperative game
b [[7;6;4;1]; [5;6;4;1]]
That is, for each (S;T ) 2 3N ,
b(S;T ) =
8><>:
1 if w(S) 7 and m(T )< 5
 1 if w(S)< 7 and m(T ) 5
0 otherwise.
In this game the worth 1 is attained by the coalitions
(f1;2g;f3g);(f1;3g;f2g);(f1;2g; /0);(f1;3g; /0) and (f1;2;3g; /0);
the worth -1 by coalitions
( /0;f1;2;3g);( /0;f1;2g);( /0;f1;3g);( /0;f2;3g);( /0;f1g);(f1g;f2;3g);
(f2g;f1;3g);(f3g;f1;2g);(f2g;f1g);(f3g;f1g) and (f2;3g;f1g);
and 0 by the remaining coalitions.
From Definition 4.6 the MLE of b is
f (X ;Y;Z)= y1y2y3 y1y2z3 y1y3z2 y2y3z1 y1z2z3 x1y2y3 x2y1y3 x3y1y2 x2y1z3 
x3y1z2+ x1x2z3  x2x3y1+ x1x3y2+ x1x2z3+ x1x3z2+ x1x2x3
We compute p–binomial bisemivalues by using the MLE technique and Table 1
shows the p–binomial bisemivalues for each player i and for several values of p.
i ypi [v] p= 1=6 p= 1=3 (Banzhaf) p= 1=2
1  2p2+2p+1 1.2778 1.4444 1.5000
2 2p(1  p) 0.2778 0.4444 0.5000
3 2p(1  p) 0.2778 0.4444 0.5000
Table 1. p–binomial bisemivalues for several values of p
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Example 5.2 Two insurance companies, A1 and A2, are always in competition in
order to obtain the maximum number of clients in a region. If N is the set of insurance
agents, each one of them with an owner clients’ list, we can define the bicooperative
game b(S;T ) as A1’s benefits when players in S work for A1, players in T work for
A2 and players in N n (S[T ) do not work for A1 neither A2.
Consider N = f1;2;3g the number of insurance agents and assume that players 1 and
3 are the agents with the biggest and the smallest clients’ list respectively. If an agent
lives company A1, he can go to A2 and take part or the whole list of his clients or, on
the contrary, go to another type of company unrelated to insurances, to be retired, ...
In the first case company A1 is more damaged than in the second one.
In this situation, let b be the cooperative game defined by
b(f1;2;3g; /0) = 100, b( /0; /0) = 0, b( /0;f1;2;3g) = 60,
b(f1;3g; /0) = 85, b(f2;3g; /0) = 75, b(f1;2g; /0) = 90,
b(f1;3g;f2g) = 50, b(f2;3g;f1g) = 20, b(f1;2g;f3g) = 60,
b(f3g; /0) = 65, b(f2g; /0) = 70, b(f1g; /0) = 80,
b(f3g;f1g) = 5, b(f3g;f2g) = 15, b(f2g;f1g) = 10,
b(f2g;f3g) = 35, b(f1g;f2g) = 40, b(f1g;f3g) = 50,
b(f3g;f1;2g) = 25, b(f2g;f1;3g) = 20, b(f1g;f2;3g) = 5,
b( /0;f1g) = 30, b( /0;f2g) = 15, b( /0;f3g) = 10,
b( /0;f2;3g) = 30, b( /0;f1;3g) = 40, b( /0;f1;2g) = 50.
Table 2 shows the p–binomial bisemivalues for each player i and for several values
of p.
i ypi [v] p= 1=6 p= 1=3 (Banzhaf) p= 2=5 p= 1=2
1 435=4 175p=2+135p2=4 95.1042 83.3333 79.15 73.4375
2 315=4 155p=2+135p2=4 66.7708 56.6667 53.15 48.4375
3 65 70p+25p2 54.0278 44.4445 41 36.25
Table 2. p–binomial bisemivalues for several values of p
It is easy to check that yp1 [v] yp2 [v] yp3 [v] for all p 2 [0;1] and the three players’
maximum and minimum allocations, ypi [v], i= 1;2;3, are obtained when p= 0 (the
dictatorial index) and p= 1 (the marginal index), respectively.
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